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THE W O R L D AFTER MODERNITY

JOHN J. REILLV
INDEPENDENT SCHOLAR

A persistent and highly influential image of the future appeared in
the late nineteenth century. It occurred to a long list of people: I might
mention Ernst von Lasaulx, Henry and Brooks Adams, Nikolai
Danilevsky, Nikolai Berdyaev and Walter Schubart, and for that matter
Albert Schweitzer and Jacob Burckhardt. They all shared the intuition
that the Western world had entered a new "Hellenistic" age, and the
twentieth century was going to see a recurrence of the less pleasant
aspects of Hellenism. These would include such things as demagogic
tyrannies, annihilation warfare, and a relaxation of traditional restraints
in art and personal life.
Nietzsche had said as much, too, and in fact anyone who entered
the 20th century with this modest insight would have met with few surprises. During the 20 century itself, the notion was worked up into
great, formal models of history. This enterprise is sometimes called
"macrohistory," unless it waxes very philosophical, in which case it is
called "metahistory." Either way, the best-known example is still
Oswald Spengler's "Decline of the West," the first of whose two volumes appeared just as the First World War ended. The biggest example,
in fact the biggest book of the 20' century, is Arnold Toynbee's 12-volume "Study of History," most of which was published in the 1930s and
'50s. The aspect of the Hellenistic analogy that chiefly interested them,
like us today, is the way the modern era can be expected to end.
To put it more crudely than most macrohistorians do, the idea is
that, just as the Hellenistic phase of Classical culture ended in the
Roman Empire, and just as the Warring States period in Chinese history ended in imperial unification under the Qin Dynasty, so the modern
era of Western Civilization would end in a post-national universal state.
For the sake of brevity, and because some of the authors we will consider do likewise, we will call this final phase of historical development
simply "the Empire."
We are talking here about the evolution from Alexander to Caesar.
Some macrohistorians expected Western modernity to last the same
length of time, two-and-half or three centuries. We may note that
macrohistorians generally equate Alexander and Napoleon, so, if you
like, you can do the arithmetic to see where we are now. If you really
like these analogies, we may also note that the societies most often iden1
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tified as universal states, Han China, the Roman Empire, the Ottoman
Empire, and New Kingdom Egypt, all lasted about 500 years after their
founding by a Caesar-like figure. So, now you know the future. Just try
to look surprised when it happens.
Philosophical history of this type gives most historians fits, but it's
inescapable. Northrop Frye was not a great fan of "The Decline of the
West," at least on its merits, but he also said "we are all Spenglerians."
For instance, Spengler can be considered the father of multiculturalism.
He treats the eight cultures whose life cycles he considers as all equivalent in some sense. Although he was developing ideas that had long
been familiar from German historicism , the fact is that he wrote the
first history of the world that really was about the world, and not just a
chronicle of the rise of the West.
Cyclical historical analogies affect statecraft. Henry Kissinger's
undergraduate thesis at Harvard was on Spengler, and he never quite got
over it. Former President Bill Clinton's favorite teacher at Georgetown,
at least by some accounts, was Carroll Quigley, a follower of Toynbee
in the School of Foreign Service. The debates after the Cold War about
globalization and American hegemony have, in effect, put the Empire
front and center.
Perhaps the most topical model of international relations these days
is Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations." He accepts the
Hellenistic analogy as a matter of course, though with his own peculiar
spin. He tells us:
"[T]he international system expanded beyond the West and became
multicivilizational. Simultaneously, conflict among Western states which had dominated that system for centuries - faded away. By the late
twentieth century, the West has moved out of its 'warring state' phase of
development as a civilization and toward its 'universal state' phase. At
the end of [the 20 ] century, this phase is still incomplete as the nation
states of the West cohere into two semi-universal states in Europe and
North America. These two entities and their constituent units are, however, bound together by an extraordinary complex network of formal
and informal institutional ties. The universal states of previous civilizations are empires. Since democracy, however, is the political form of
Western civilization, the emerging universal state of Western civilization is not an empire but rather a compound of federations, confederations, and international regimes and organizations."
Among scholars interested in such things, Huntington is a little
unusual in rejecting the idea of global civilization. Among people with
5
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a basically cyclical approach to history, he is also, as we will see, unusual in assuming the continuing vitality of democracy. On the other hand,
he is not at all unusual in considering that the Empire already exists to
some extent. This is the thesis of the fashionable book, entitled
"Empire," by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri.
According to those authors, the Empire is Saint Augustine's City of
God. They themselves are Marxists who write impenetrable postmodern prose and who hope to replace the City of God with the City of Man,
but their analysis is worth considering, to the extent they will permit
themselves to be understood. Like its Roman predecessor, today's
Empire seems to its subjects to be permanent, eternal, and necessary. It
has no outside, at least in principle, and internally it distinguishes neither male nor female, Jew nor Gentile, slave nor free. It does not rest on
conquest, but on consensus.
The Empire is the post-historical incarnation of eternal justice. It
does not merely happen to exist, like a historically contingent state;
rather, it must exist, at least as an ideal. It closes the gap that opened in
the Renaissance between the ethical and the juridical. Its wars are just
wars, police actions against opponents who cannot make a principled
case against the Empire as such. No civil or military stresses remain that
might threaten it. The Empire is always in a crisis, so its acts are emergency measures that trump the ordinary law of the sovereignties and
corporations that comprise it.
The authors say the Empire is not really a state. It does indeed have
state-like organs, such as the UN and the IMF, but it has no center. For
that matter, it has no geography: the old divisions between First, Second
and Third World have collapsed. The difference between France and
India in the world system, for instance, has become a matter of degree
rather than kind. The Empire does have a tripartite anatomy, in the sense
of an executive, an aristocracy, and a people, like that which the second
century B.C. historian Polybius ascribed to the late Roman Republic.
The Empire is imperial, not imperialist. Imperialism, in the
authors' analysis, was simply the extension of European nationalism
outside Europe. The Empire arose precisely because capitalism could
not endure if the divisions between nations were not dissolved. The
authors count the loss of national sovereignty, and even of national
identity, as no great tragedy. Nations themselves, as well as the Peoples
that comprised them, were largely confected for the benefit of early capitalist production.
A retired CIA analyst, Patrick E. Kennon, recently published a
10
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witty apology for the Empire as an ideal, entitled "Tribe and Empire."
He finds far deeper support for the Empire than does Samuel
Huntington, who dismisses the actual membership of international society as a thin crust of what he calls "Davos People." According to Mr.
Kennon:
"Now, as we enter the twenty-first century, the future of the nationstate is much in doubt.. .Indeed, tribalism has revived with a brutal savagery from Rwanda and Cambodia to the newly dissolved USSR and
the newly unified Germany...At the same time, a kind of shadow
empire...is being embraced by elites around the globe. UN bureaucrats
and Greenpeace activists, Carlos the Jackal and Mother Theresa, Toyota
and Amnesty International, the Cali drug cartel and the World Bank,
people who worry about the dollar-yen ratio and people who worry
about the ozone layer, all of these consciously or unconsciously look to
empire for their profit or salvation. All of these have largely given up on
the nation.""
Mr. Kennon attempts to account for globalization and its attendant
anarchic backlash in terms of classical Social Contract theory (the very
class of theory that Hardt and Negri say is the source of false consciousness in the world today). "Tribe and Empire" argues that the
philosophers of the Enlightenment were too pessimistic in relegating
international relations to the state of nature. According to Mr. Kennon,
there is an ethical trajectory that leads away from the local and toward
the universal, from the political and toward the administrative, from
predation and toward commerce.
The pure forms of human life, the "tribe" and the "empire," correspond to "community" and "society," respectively. These dualities also
correspond to life before and after the Social Contract. The contract
turns mere homo sapiens into human beings. In the tribe, everyone is
equal, every man is a warrior, and there is the war of all against all. In
society, there are no enemies, only superiors and inferiors. Community
is familiar and exclusive, governed by a traditional morality that is not
subject to analysis. In society, there is ethics rather than morality, and
right and wrong are subject to pragmatic reformulation. The most significant thing about ethics is that it is universal in principle: everyone,
near and far, should ideally be treated according to the same rules. The
political form that has substantially fulfilled this ideal is the "empire,"
something that has in fact existed at various times and places.
So far we have been talking about the Empire in terms of political
theory, but that is not the only aspect of the Hellenistic analogy that
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol49/iss49/10
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interests macrohistorians. They are concerned with the way that whole
societies evolve, and this is one of the points about which they have
received the most criticism. They tend to speak as if societies were
organic wholes, with life cycles like living things. This analogy is no
worse than any other, but it is difficult to defend in detail. Burckhardt,
in fact, even though he saw parallels between his own late 19th century
and late antiquity, specifically rejected the biological analogy. We
should note, though, that even those who used organic language most
heavily were not necessarily relying on it.
Spengler himself is a good case in point. Though he spoke of the
cultures he examined as living organisms, his philosophy was much
more sophisticated. "The Decline of the West" is a profoundly Kantian
book. In Spengler's view, the course of history is circumscribed by the
limits to human understanding that Kant described. According to
Spengler, just eight cultures in the history of the world have tested those
limits, in the sense of trying to produce final answers to life's questions.
Beginning from a unique religious base, each produced its own philosophy, family of arts, and a political style. Spengler said that even the
natural science and mathematics of each were idiosyncratic. In any
case, all these attempts to express universal truths are failures. Whatever
meaning they have is internal to the societies that produce them, and the
skepticism of the late culture realizes the fact. However, the attempts
are not just failures; they are magnificent failures. The living cultures
that Spengler describes die, but in the process produce fossils, canons
of art and science and political forms. The period of fossilization, after
the end of the culture proper, is what Spengler calls civilization, which
he said began for the West at the end of the 18 century. The work of
modernity, in Spengler's estimation, is the completion of the final
forms.
The German title of Spengler's big book, "Der Untergang des
Abendlandes," is not nearly so ominous as its English translation.
Literally, it is closer to "The Sunset of the Evening Land." Spengler
himself said that he might better have called the book the "The
Completion of the West," or even "The Perfection of the West."
All this suggests Francis Fukuyama was essentially correct in saying that the West has reached "the end of history" : liberal democracy
really is the end of Western political thought. It will never be superseded, and it will never cease to have some effect on the way government
is conducted. However, that does not mean it may not someday be honored chiefly in the breach. Spengler wrote this eighty years ago, speak12
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ing about a time that could still be a good century beyond us:
"Once the Imperial Age has arrived, there are no more political
problems. People manage with the situation as it is and the powers that
be. In the period of Contending States, torrents of blood had reddened
the pavements of all world-cities, so that the great truths of Democracy
might be turned into actualities, and for the winning of rights without
which life seemed not worth the living. Now these rights are won, but
the grandchildren cannot be moved, even by punishment, to make use
of them. A hundred years more, and even the historians will no longer
understand the old controversies."'
In 1920, it was easy to imagine that some totalitarian system might
conquer the world, but it took a measure of imagination to foresee a
world in which democracy is simply forgotten. No imagination at all is
necessary today, what with the low voter turnouts in the US and the
emergence of post-democratic supranational entities like the European
Union. The Empire means the end of democracy as anything but a venerable anachronism. Indeed, as Patrick Kennon would have it, it means
the end of politics itself.
In his view, government by reliable routine has been the distinguishing feature of the Empire wherever it has existed. Politics went on,
of course, in Antonine Rome or Ming China, but as self-contained court
intrigues and bureaucratic squabbles. It was no longer in a position to
derail the essential operation of the state. The same process in the West
is far advanced, and maybe this is a good thing. The mandarins in
Brussels are often crudely corrupt, and they don't respond to emergencies particularly well. They are, however, quite certain not to lead civilization over a cliff in pursuit of a manifest destiny, something that
national societies have done in almost every century.
A recurrent theme in metahistory is that the economic Left always
wins. William McNeill, another admirer of Toynbee, has made the
observation that governance tends to expand to cover the size of the
economy. (16) Where it doesn't, the result is piracy, and often barbarian
powers that threaten civilization itself. The Empire, in the form of universal states, can and does facilitate economic activity through the rule
of law, or at least through maintaining public order. On the other hand,
it is also in a position to tax and regulate universally, which it does in
the interests of income redistribution and the prevention of disruption
from economic change. So, for example, the expansive, technologically innovative economy that appeared in China during the politically
chaotic Sung and Yuan periods was brought to heel when order was
5
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restored in the Ming period. By the 18 century, China's manufacturing
sector was still huge and sophisticated, but wholly subordinate to the
imperial autocracy and gentry."
On the other hand, the Cultural Left always loses. The arts under
the Empire are well funded, technically proficient, and highly eclectic,
but they are rarely new. The art of Old and Middle Kingdom Egypt, for
instance, can usually be dated to within a generation, just as the periods
of Western art can be easily distinguished from the Middle Ages on
down. When you get to the New Kingdom, the age of the Empire, repetition predominates, except for freakish episodes like the Amarna period. The work that survives from the very end of Egyptian civilization is
almost impossible to distinguish from that of the Old Kingdom 1500
years before. One might say that Egyptian history ended in a sort of permanent Gothic revival.
The function of art organizations today is generally curatorial. With
some notable exceptions, orchestras usually find themselves playing the
familiar canon that runs from Bach to Brahms. In the 20 century, for
the first time in the cultural history of the West, time began to no longer
make a difference. Imagine two picture books, one of the famous New
York Armory Exhibition of 1913 and the other of the Brooklyn
Museum's "Sensation" exhibition of 1999. Now imagine switching the
covers. The switched dates would still be plausible. The point is not that
the work is bad; it's just that it isn't going anywhere.
What is true of art is also supposed to be true of science, but this
question would take too long to explore. The notion is that some areas
of rational inquiry can simply be finished. Classical Mathematics, to
take the easiest example, was substantially completed in Hellenistic
times by Euclidian geometry. It did not advance further, because that
geometry answered the questions Classical culture asked. So, for that
matter, did Ptolemy's astronomy and Aristotle's physics. Those who
apply the analogy to the West note that physics entered the 20 century
with quantum mechanics and relativity and spent the century merely
elaborating them. A "theory of everything," which would combine the
two, may be achieved in this century. If so, it would seem to meet the
criteria for one of Spengler's magnificent fossils.
The Empire is a theocracy. In general, macrohistorians have welcomed the prospect of religious revival. The chief example is Toynbee
himself, who decided that history was really about the development of
universal religions, and only incidentally about civilizations. His "Study
of History" became remarkably evangelical in its later volumes.
th
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Toynbee's reputation never recovered from the derisive, secularist critique that Hugh Trevor-Roper gave his work. As we know, God severely punished Hugh Trevor-Roper for this through the Hitler Diaries
fraud, but that's another story. Samuel Huntington acknowledges the
growing role of religion, though he seems less than pleased at the
prospect, calling it "la revanche de Dieu." He speaks of "the end of the
Westphalian order," referring to those aspects of the Treaty of
Westphalia of 1648 ensuring religion would be a domestic matter.
An influential argument supporting just this change has recently
been offered by A.J. Conyers in his book, "The Long Truce: How
Toleration Made the World Safe for Power and Profit." Conyers says
the kind of toleration that spread in the West after the wars of religion
is actually something of a fraud. It is based on a nominalist metaphysics
that brackets the truth claims of each confession as parochial eccentricities. Religious truth-claims must be tolerated for the sake of peace, but
merit no deference from the wider world. Conyers says that toleration
in the West before the wars of religion, where it existed, had a different
basis. Traditionally, tolerance assumed the validity of truth claims, but
took the platonic view that specific expressions of them could, at best,
be expected to be incomplete. Now that the Westphalian truce is over,
Conyers argues, this traditional approach to tolerance should supplant
the disingenuous secularist one of the past few centuries.
Some suggestion of where it may lead is offered by Spengler's
famous prophecy of the "the Second Religiousness." He tells us:
21

22
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"But neither in the creations of this piety nor in the form of the Roman
Imperium is there anything primary and spontaneous. Nothing is built
up, no idea unfolds itself — it is only as if a mist cleared off the land
and revealed the old forms, uncertainly at first, but presently with
increasing distinctness. The material of the Second Religiousness is
simply that of the first, genuine, young religiousness — only otherwise experienced and expressed. It starts with Rationalism's fading
out in helplessness, then the forms of the Springtime become visible,
and finally the whole world of the primitive religion, which had
receded before the grand forms of the early faith, returns to the foreground, powerful in the guise of the popular syncretism that is to be
found in every Culture at this phase."
24

This brings us to the decline and fall of the Empire. Not all macrohistorians say that the Empire is inherently mortal. Hardt and Negri say
specifically that, whatever traditional Marxism might have predicted
about the fate of the world capitalist system, the Empire has moved
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beyond those vulnerabilities. The Empire actually thrives on crisis. It is
eternal in principle. However, that does not mean that it cannot be overthrown through an act of will. They offer this comparison from a prior
incarnation of the Empire:
"Allow us [an] analogy that refers to the birth of Christianity in
Europe and its expansion during the decline of the Roman Empire. In
this process an enormous potential of subjectivity was constructed
and consolidated in terms of the prophecy of a world to come, a chiliastic project. This new subjectivity offered an absolute alternative to
the spirit of imperial right—a new ontological basis. From this perspective, Empire was accepted as the "maturity of the times" and the
unity of the entire known civilization, but it was challenged in its
totality by a completely different ethical and ontological axis. In the
same way today, given that the limits and unresolvable problems of
the new imperial right are fixed, theory and practice can go beyond
them, finding once again an ontological basis of antagonism—within
Empire, but also against and beyond Empire, at the same level of
totality."
25

This would be more interesting if the two authors had not excluded religion as a future revolutionary force. One of their few substantive
suggestions for undermining the Empire is an absolute freedom to travel and immigration. This also happens to be the only right that Patrick
Kennon of the CIA says is essential for the integrity of the Empire. As
the French say, go figure.
Spengler, too, was of the opinion that the Empire did not have to
end. Fossils can last indefinitely. In his estimate, Classical civilization
was destroyed by historical accident. There was no internal reason why
it could not have gone on without collapse as he thought, wrongly, that
China had done. Spengler in his later work suggested that the imperial
phase of Western history was likely to end apocalyptically for the whole
world, but that is a question specific to Spengler studies.
Toynbee was of two minds about the future. He thought that either
the winner of another world war would create a Western Universal
State, or that an ecumenical society would arise peacefully. It would
have western characteristics, and maybe a world government, but it
would not be a Universal State in the traditional sense. For Toynbee the
Universal State was a slow-motion catastrophe that was doomed from
the start, even though, as he put it, its citizens "in defiance of apparently plain facts...are prone to regard it, not as a night's shelter in the
wilderness but as the Promised Land, the goal of human endeavors."
26
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In his view, the Empire's internal proletariat deserts it in favor of a higher religion, in rather the way Hardt and Negri mention, while at the
same time the outer barbarians become stronger and stronger. This view
is not so different from Huntington's "Clash of Civilization" thesis,
which interprets "the decline of the West" to mean the decline of the
still-forming Western universal state relative to other civilized societies.
The Empire we have been considering is an archetype. I mean this in a
modest sense. It's an inevitable notion that anyone thinking about
world history is going to have to confront, even if only to reject. Hardt
and Negri do hit the nail on the head: the Empire does look like the
City of God, although Toynbee may have been on to something when
he cautioned that it is a counterfeit of the real thing. Obviously, there
is no way to say today whether the Empire is going to stay in the platonic realm, or whether, as the macrohistorians speculate, it will
become incarnate in the light of day. In any case, although the Empire
may fall, it never goes away.
An earlier form of this paper was presented at the Sixth Annual
Conference of the Center for Millennial Studies, Boston University,
November 3 to 6, 2001
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